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United States (US) Presidential candidate George W. Bush recently provided some guidelines on the 
viability and nature of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense for the United States during a speech at 
the National Press Club. Public discourse on these guidelines seems to be focused on single Issues like 
Bush's druthers for a defense system more comprehensive (in range and architecture) than that of US 
President Clinton, for a draw-down on US nuclear weapons towards a figure compatible with a 
successfully negotiated and ratified Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty III, for unilaterally taking various 
US nuclear assets off of alert status, and for abrogating or going beyond the ABM treaty. 
 
This public discourse is wanting in three respects. First, a concurrent internal assessment of all the 
guidelines seems to be largely ignored--especially as to potential escapes from or inconsistencies of 
logic. Second, a concurrent external assessment of all the guidelines seems to be largely ignored as well-
-especially as to the derivative and interactive consequences for other significant political actors such as 
Russia, the People's Republic of China, and various rogue nation-states and non-state political actors. 
Third, the necessary assessment of the interactions of internal and external cannot be effected until the 
first two inadequacies are dealt with. 
 
When guidelines develop into policy and programs supporting deterrence, non-proliferation, other 
strategic goals, and--if necessary--system employment, the three wanting elements of discourse must 
be seriously addressed. At this point a defense becomes defensible. (See Berkowitz, N. H., Hylander, L., 
Bakaitis, R. (1973). Defense, vulnerability, and cooperation in a mixed-motive game. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 401-407; Excerpts from Bush's remarks on national security and 
arms policy. (May 24, 2000). The New York Times, p. A19; Lebow, R. N., & Stein, J. G. (1987). Beyond 
deterrence. Journal of Social Issues, 43, 5-71; Ramirez, J. R. (1982). Echein: The built-in problem in the 
psychology of vehicle driving, arms possession and nuclear capability. Journal of Evolutionary 
Psychology, 3, 86-102; Wessells, M.G. (1995). Social-psychological determinants of nuclear proliferation: 
A dual-process analysis. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 1, 49-65.) (Keywords: George 
W. Bush, Missile Defense, Public Discourse.) 
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